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Design of price mechanisms for network resource allocation via price of anarchy

Design of price mechanisms for network resource allocation via price of anarchy,Y. J. Chen,J. Zhang

Design of price mechanisms for network resource allocation via price of anarchy   (Citations: 11)
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Published in 2005.
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    • ...The efficiency loss of the Kelly mechanism was first studied by Johari and Tsitsiklis (2004); subsequently, several others have studied efficiency loss of related resource allocation mechanisms, including Chen and Zhang (2008), Johari et al. (2005), Johari and Tsitsiklis (2006), Maheswaran (2003), Maheswaran and Basar (2004), Moulin (2008b), Sanghavi and Hajek (2004), and Yang and Hajek (2006a)...

    Ramesh Johariet al. Efficiency of Scalar-Parameterized Mechanisms

    • ...There exists a large volume of literature in terms of studying PoA in the contexts of wireline networking, e.g., [9], [19], [20]...

    Lok Man Lawet al. Price of Anarchy for Cognitive MAC Games

    • ...Chen and Zhang [5] recently presented a class of pricing mechanisms satisfying certain axioms for which they proved improved bounds on the price of anarchy, if users are price anticipating...
    • ...Chen and Zhang [5] defined certain axioms for a feasible pricing mechanism and derived for quadratic cost functions (which corresponds to linear marginal cost functions) a slightly better efficiency guarantee (0:686) than the bound (2=3) proved for the marginal cost pricing, see Johari and Tsitsiklis [14]...
    • ...Tsitsiklis [14], Moulin [20], and Chen and Zhang [5], shows that for bounding the price of anarchy it is sufficient to bound the price of anarchy for linear utility functions and single link networks...
    • ...Lemma 3.3: [[5],[14],[20]] For bounding the price of anarchy, it is enough to consider instances in which utility functions are linear...

    Tobias Harkset al. Efficiency and stability of Nash equilibria in resource allocation gam...

    • ...The first mechanisms to be evaluated in this way were the familiar output-sharing methods ([10],[11],[29],[37]) and cost-sharing methods ([4],[12])...
    • ...Classic examples of cost sharing methods include the regulation of congestion by fees: peakload pricing [32], telephone billing [2], access to a network [22], capacity-sharing in networks [4],[14] [26]...
    • ...An important difference between our computation of the price of anarchy and that proposed in the recent literature ([4],[10],[11],[12],[29],[37]) inspiring this paper, is the accounting of the overcharge...
    • ...1Marginal cost pricing is another familiar method: each unit of demand is charged the marginal cost at total demand ([27] and [4],[12] discuss respectively its axiomatic and incentives properties...
    • ...Here we compute the three guaranteed surplus for every n, in the simple and much studied case ([4],[10]) of a quadratic cost function...

    Hervé Moulin. The price of anarchy of serial, average and incremental cost sharing

    • ...Equations (4) and (5) imply that for any odd q, b (q) = b (q +1) and Uq = Uq+1...
    • ...We find that equation (5) where c replaces a defines a q-fair mechanism achieving the cap e (q) = b (q) ((4))...

    Hervé Moulin. On efficient and almost budget balanced allocation mechanisms

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