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Partisan Politics and Intergovernmental Transfers in India

Partisan Politics and Intergovernmental Transfers in India,Stuti Khemani

Partisan Politics and Intergovernmental Transfers in India   (Citations: 19)
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Recently there has been a surge in international empirical evidence that nationalpolicymakers allocate resources across regions based on political considerations, inaddition to any normative considerations of equity and efficiency. In order to mitigatethese political compulsions, several federations around the world have attempted to createindependent constitutional bodies that are responsible for determining federal transfers tosub-national jurisdictions. This paper tests whether...
Published in 2002.
Cumulative Annual
    • ...1 See, for example, Geddes (1994); Levitt and Snyder (1995); Fleck (1999); Case (2001); Khemani (2003); Miguel and Zaidi (2003); Crampton 2004; Calvo & Murillo (2004); Milligan and Smart (2005); Leigh (2006); Cadot, Röller and Stephan (2006)...

    Jacob Allenet al. Using the Error in Pre-election Polls to Test for the Presence of Pork

    • ...In a previous version of this paper, Khemani (2003) showed that political effects on such specific purpose transfers can be distinguished from that on general purpose transfers that become a part of state budgets...

    Stuti Khemani. Does delegation of fiscal policy to an independent agency make a diffe...

    • ... in intergovernmental transfers to sub-national jurisdictions within countries cannot be explained by traditional concerns of equity and efficiency alone, and that political variables representing electoral incentives of public agents are additional and significant determinants (Inman, 1988; Grossman, 1994; Pereyra, 1996; Worthington and Dollery, 1998; Porto and Sanguinetti, 2001; Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2003; Johansson, 2003; Khemani, ...
    • ...Extending this literature to federal arrangements in developing countries, Porto and Sanguinetti (2001) and Khemani (2003) provide evidence from Argentina and India respectively that provinces that are politically more important for the central government receive greater transfers...
    • ...A third factor is the partisan affiliation of voters and governments, where the effect of party identity depends upon the nature of electoral competition (Grossman, 1994; Levitt and Snyder, 1995; Worthington and Dollery, 1998; Khemani, 2003)...
    • ...Several federations around the world have attempted to create politically independent bodies that are responsible for determining federal transfers to sub-national jurisdictions.1 However, until recently (Khemani, 2003), there was no evidence in the...
    • ...Using disaggregated data on transfers and political variables for the major Indian states from 1972-1995, Khemani (2003) finds a pattern of evidence that shows that while the transfers that are determined by political agents are indeed distributed to serve political objectives, the distribution of transfers by an independent agency curbs political influence and is consistent with promoting equity...
    • ...Khemani (2003) argues that these results suggest that constitutional rules indeed act as a check on politically motivated distribution of resources by the national executive...
    • ...Political effects on the distribution of transfers across states are identical to that reported in Khemani (2003)—while discretionary transfers are targeted to those affiliated states where the ruling party controls a smaller proportion of seats in the national legislature (to maximize the party’s representation in the legislature), transfers determined by the independent agency is consistent with promoting equity across states by curbing ...

    Stuti Khemani. The Political Economy of Equalization Transfers

    • ...is reasonably independent from the political process. Khemani (2003) provides evidence...

    Stuti Khemani. Local Government Accountability for Service Delivery in Nigeria

    • ...consistent with recent evidence on the political determinants of systematic channels of intergovernmental transfers to the states in India (Dasgupta, Dhillon, and Dutta 2001, Khemani 2002, and Rao and Singh 2000)...
    • ...Khemani (2002) develops a model of central resource allocation where the solution is characterized by greater central transfers to politically affiliated states because the center...
    • ...Khemani (2002) provides evidence that political affiliation between the center and the states affects the distribution of intergovernmental transfers in India in much the same way as its effect on fiscal deficits...
    • ...Khemani (2002) develops a model of central resource allocation where the solution is characterized by greater central transfers to affiliated states...
    • ...Khemani (2002) contrasts the effect of political variables on different channels of transfers and shows that the transfers determined by some agencies are more amenable to control by the national political executive...

    Stuti Khemani. Federal Politics and Budget Deficits: Evidence from the States of Indi...

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