Wirelessly Pickpocketing a Mifare Classic Card

Wirelessly Pickpocketing a Mifare Classic Card,10.1109/SP.2009.6,Flavio D. Garcia,Peter Van Rossum,Roel Verdult,Ronny Wichers Schreur

Wirelessly Pickpocketing a Mifare Classic Card   (Citations: 8)
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The Mifare Classic is the most widely used contactless smartcard on the market. The stream cipher CRYPTO1 used by the Classic has recently been reverse engi- neered and serious attacks have been proposed. The most serious of them retrieves a secret key in under a second. In order to clone a card, previously proposed attacks require that the adversary either has access to an eavesdropped communication session or exe- cutes a message-by-message man-in-the-middle attack between the victim and a legitimate reader. Although this is already disastrous from a cryptographic point of view, system integrators maintain that these attacks cannot be performed undetected. This paper proposes four attacks that can be ex- ecuted by an adversary having only wireless access to just a card (and not to a legitimate reader). The most serious of them recovers a secret key in less than a second on ordinary hardware. Besides the crypto- graphic weaknesses, we exploit other weaknesses in the protocol stack. A vulnerability in the computation of parity bits allows an adversary to establish a side channel. Another vulnerability regarding nested authentications provides enough plaintext for a speedy known-plaintext attack.
Conference: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy - S&P , pp. 3-15, 2009
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