Bayes-nash equilibria of the generalized second price auction

Bayes-nash equilibria of the generalized second price auction,10.1145/1566374.1566389,IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,Renato D. Gomes,Kane S.

Bayes-nash equilibria of the generalized second price auction   (Citations: 6)
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We develop a Bayes-Nash analysis of the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction. First, we characterize the efficient Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the GSP when such an equilibrium exists. We obtain sufficient conditions on click-through rates that guarantee existence and show that an efficient equilibrium may fail to exist if click-through rates across slots are sufficiently close. Next, we derive the counter-intuitive result that the seller's revenue may decrease as click-through rates increase. Fortunately, we show that setting optimal reserve prices reverses this result. Further, we prove that the GSP possesses no mixed strategy equilibrium and that no inefficient equilibrium can be symmetric.
Journal: IEEE Transactions on Information Theory - TIT , pp. 107-108, 2009
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    • ...Gomes and Sweeney[8] consider a Bayes Nash equilibria of a GSP.,Section 5 presents the results of estimations made using that model, Section 6 explores in detail similarities and differences between our model and some other works [3, 8], and we conclude in Section 7.,In this section we give theoretical comparisons between our model with Athey and Nekipelov’s [3] first, and with Gomes and Sweeney’s model [8].,In [8], Gomes and Sweeney consider a Bayesian model where N players with random i.i.d.,which corresponds to equation (1) of [8], up to notations (Gomes and Sweeney number their slots from 1 to S< N, while we number ours from 0 to K>N ,b ut we can take sk =0 for k ≥ S)...

    Furcy Pinet al. Stochastic variability in sponsored search auctions: observations and ...

    • ...In [18], [19], the authors provided an integral equation that efficient symmetric BNEs need to satisfy...

    Linjing Liet al. Refinement of symmetrical Nash equilibrium for generalized second-pric...

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