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Keywords
(5)
Abnormal Return
Corporate Control
Corporate Governance
Merger and Acquisition
Real Estate Investment Trust
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Corporate Governance and Performance in the Market for Corporate Control: The Case of REITs
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Corporate Governance and Performance in the Market for Corporate Control: The Case of REITs
(
Citations: 3
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Robert D. Campbell
,
Chinmoy Ghosh
,
Milena Petrova
,
C. F. Sirmans
We examine 132 mergers and acquisitions by Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) during 1997–2006 and explore the relationship between acquirer external and internal
corporate governance
mechanisms and announcement abnormal returns. We argue that in regulated industries with absent active takeover market, the importance of outside governance mechanisms is diminished and substituted by internal governance controls. We focus on the REIT industry. We find that bidder returns are higher for REITs with smaller boards, with more experienced CEOs, but with shorter tenure. Acquirers’ announcement returns are also significantly and positively related to higher ownership by their CEOs and board directors. We find no significant relationship between presence of staggered board and abnormal bidder returns, which supports our hypothesis that anti-takeover defense measures have reduced importance for REITs.
Journal:
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - J REAL ESTATE FINANC ECON
, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 451-480, 2011
DOI:
10.1007/s11146-009-9202-2
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References
(75)
Powerful CEOs and Their Impact on Corporate Performance
(
Citations: 66
)
Renee B. Adams
,
Heitor Almeida
,
Daniel Ferreira
Journal:
Review of Financial Studies - REV FINANC STUD
, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 1403-1432, 2005
The gains to bidding firms from merger
(
Citations: 204
)
P. Asquith
,
R. Bruner
,
D. Mullins
Journal:
Journal of Financial Economics - J FINAN ECON
, vol. 11, no. 1-4, pp. 121-139, 1983
The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers
(
Citations: 13
)
Lucian Arye Bebchuk
Journal:
Ssrn Electronic Journal
, 2002
The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy
(
Citations: 66
)
Lucian Bebchuk
,
John Coates
,
Guhan Subramanian
Published in 2005.
The costs of entrenched boards
(
Citations: 129
)
Lucian A. Bebchuk
,
Alma Cohen
Journal:
Journal of Financial Economics - J FINAN ECON
, vol. 78, no. 2, pp. 409-433, 2005
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Citations
(3)
Why Do REITs Go Private? Differences in Target Characteristics, Acquirer Motivations, and Wealth Effects in Public and Private Acquisitions
(
Citations: 1
)
David C. Ling
,
Milena Petrova
Published in 2011.
How Does Corporate Governance Affect the Quality of Investor Information? The Curious Case of REITs
(
Citations: 1
)
Paul Anglin
,
Yanmin Gao
,
Robert Edelstein
REIT Going Private Decisions
James C. Brau
,
J. Troy Carpenter
,
Mauricio Rodriguez
,
C. F. Sirmans