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Related Publications
(133)
Multipart pricing of public goods
Optimal Auction Design
Algorithmic Mechanism Design
The property rights doctrine and demand revelation under incomplete information
Optimal multi-unit auctions
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Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders
Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders,William Vickrey
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Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders
(
Citations: 2323
)
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William Vickrey
Published in 1961.
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Citation Context
(967)
...private values,
Vickrey (1961)
shows that bidders have a weakly dominant strategy to bid...
Kenneth Hendricks
,
et al.
Last-Minute Bidding in Sequential Auctions with Unobserved, Stochastic...
...Ever since the pioneering work of
Vickrey (1961)
the auction literature has provided a number of fundamental insights regarding efficient auction design...
...This is for example the case in the sealed bid second-price auction of
Vickrey (1961)
where the highest bidder wins but the price paid is the second-highest bid...
Tommy Andersson
,
et al.
Properties of the DGS-Auction Algorithm
...By contrast, the dominant bidding strategy in a UP auction, as first shown by [End Page 658] ...
Steven Schilizzi
,
et al.
Evaluating Conservation Auctions with Unknown Bidder Costs: The Scotti...
...By contrast, the dominant bidding strategy in a UP auction, as first shown by [End Page 658] ...
Steven Schilizzi
,
et al.
Evaluating Conservation Auctions with Unknown Bidder Costs: The Scotti...
...By contrast, the dominant bidding strategy in a UP auction, as first shown by [End Page 658] ...
Steven Schilizzi
,
et al.
Evaluating Conservation Auctions with Unknown Bidder Costs: The Scotti...
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Citations
(2323)
Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
(
Citations: 6
)
Todd R. Kaplan
,
Shmuel Zamir
Journal:
Economic Theory - ECON THEORY
, pp. 1-34, 2012
Last-Minute Bidding in Sequential Auctions with Unobserved, Stochastic Entry
(
Citations: 2
)
Kenneth Hendricks
,
Ilke Onur
,
Thomas Wiseman
Published in 2012.
The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
Onur Kesteny
,
Ayşe Yazıcı
Journal:
Economic Theory - ECON THEORY
, pp. 1-26, 2012
Properties of the DGS-Auction Algorithm
Tommy Andersson
,
Christer Andersson
Journal:
Computational Economics - COMPUT ECON
, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 1-21, 2012
Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
Itai Ashlagi
,
Shigehiro Serizawa
Journal:
Social Choice and Welfare - SOC CHOICE WELFARE
, pp. 1-12, 2012