Lobbying Coalitions and Government Policy Change

Lobbying Coalitions and Government Policy Change,David Nelson,Susan Webb Yackee

Lobbying Coalitions and Government Policy Change  
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We identify the conditions under which lobbying coalitions affect the content of government policy. We theorize that narrow coalitions form when policy change is unlikely. In contrast, we expect core advocates to assemble broader coalitions of diverse memberships when policy wins or losses appear possible. We hypothesize that expanded coalition strategies influence policy, while narrow coalition strategies do not. Using a multi-level model, we test this hypothesis with survey data from lobbying entities, and a content analysis of government regulations promulgated by seven U.S. federal agencies. We find that coalition lobbying is an effective advocacy tactic for influencing policy, particularly in those cases when peripheral organizations are recruited into expanded coalitions. These findings contrast with previous quantitative studies and broadly suggest that interest groups—via lobbying coalitions—can affect the content of government policy outputs.
Published in 2010.
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