Leakage resilient eCK-secure key exchange protocol without random oracles


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This paper presents the first formalization of partial key leakage security of a two-pass two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol on the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) security model. Our formalization, λ-leakage resilient eCK security, is a (stronger) generalization of the eCK security model with enhanced by the notion of λ-leakage resilient security recently introduced by Akavia, Goldwasser and Vaikuntanathan. We present a PKI-based two-pass key exchange protocol with Hash Proof System (HPS), that is λ-leakage resilient eCK secure without random oracles.

Published in 2011.

DOI: 10.1145/1966913.1966976

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References (20)

Public-Key Encryption in the Bounded-Retrieval Model (Citations: 16)

Leakage-Resilient Public-Key Cryptography in the Bounded-Retrieval Model (Citations: 31)

Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels (Citations: 331)

Universal Hash Proofs and a Paradigm for Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Secure Public-Key Encryption (Citations: 193)

Design and Analysis of Practical Public-Key Encryption Schemes Secure against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack (Citations: 243)


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