Sign in
Author

Conference

Journal

Organization

Year

DOI
Look for results that meet for the following criteria:
since
equal to
before
between
and
Search in all fields of study
Limit my searches in the following fields of study
Agriculture Science
Arts & Humanities
Biology
Chemistry
Computer Science
Economics & Business
Engineering
Environmental Sciences
Geosciences
Material Science
Mathematics
Medicine
Physics
Social Science
Multidisciplinary
Keywords
(9)
Information Leakage
Internet Security
Random Oracle
Secure Communication
Security Requirements
Stream Cipher
Full Length
Side Channel Attacks
Standard Model
Subscribe
Academic
Publications
Practical leakageresilient pseudorandom generators
Practical leakageresilient pseudorandom generators,10.1145/1866307.1866324,Yu Yu,Fran çoisXavier Standaert,Olivier Pereira,Moti Yung
Edit
Practical leakageresilient pseudorandom generators
(
Citations: 3
)
BibTex

RIS

RefWorks
Download
Yu Yu
,
Fran çoisXavier Standaert
,
Olivier Pereira
,
Moti Yung
Cryptographic systems and protocols are the core of many
Internet security
procedures (such as SSL, SSH, IPSEC, DNSSEC, secure mail, etc.). At the heart of all cryptographic functions is a good source of randomness, and for efficiency, the primitive of pseudorandom generator (PRG). PRG can also be used in the design of stream ciphers, for secure communications. The Internet is nowadays composed of many types of devices with very different hardware and software characteristics. Hence, one of the concerns in such open environments is the information "leakage" and its exploitation via the socalled "side channel attacks". A very extensive and current research direction is designing basic cryptographic operations that are resistant to such attacks. Recent works on leakageresilient PRG and stream ciphers did significant progresses in providing tools for the analysis of sidechannel attacks in the standard cryptographic setting. But in the absence of a completely sound model for the leakages, the only constructions that can be proven secure require tweaks that do not correspond to the physical intuition. For example, constructions using an alternating structure, in which a key bitsize of $2n$ can only guarantee a security of at most $2^n$, have been designed for this purpose. In this paper, we provide two methodological contributions, allowing to get rid of these tweaks, or to reduce their impact towards negligible performance overheads. First, we show that the leakageresilience of a natural, i.e. conform to engineering experience, stateful PRG can be proven under a
random oracle
based assumption. We then discuss the relevance of this assumption, and argue that it nicely captures the reality of actual sidechannel attacks. Second, we provide the first construction of a PRG without alternating structure, that exploits the keying material to its
full length
and that can be proven leakageresilient in the standard model. For this purpose, we only need to assume a non adaptive leakage function and a small public memory. We also argue that such an assumption is not only realistic, but necessary for any leakageresilient primitive that grants adversaries with a (stateless) reinitialization capability. Together with weaker requirements for practical implementations, these contributions further reduce the gap between the theory and practice of physically observable cryptography.
Conference:
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security  CCS
, pp. 141151, 2010
DOI:
10.1145/1866307.1866324
Cumulative
Annual
View Publication
The following links allow you to view full publications. These links are maintained by other sources not affiliated with Microsoft Academic Search.
(
dl.acm.org
)
(
portal.acm.org
)
(
portal.acm.org
)
(
www.informatik.unitrier.de
)
(
doi.acm.org
)
(
www.uclouvain.be
)
More »
Citation Context
(2)
...The notion of “leakageresilient cryptography” [15,30,16,
33
,10,18,21] and the recently introduced model of “continuous memory attacks” [12,8] capture such attacks, allowing the adversary to learn a bounded amount of leakage (computed by adaptively chosen leakage functions) with every invocation...
Abhishek Jain
,
et al.
Parallel Repetition for Leakage Resilience Amplification Revisited
...Recently, Yu et al. proposed leakage resilient stream cipher with less secret information [
27
]...
Shin’ichiro Matsuo
,
et al.
LeakageResilient RFID Authentication with ForwardPrivacy
References
(27)
Power Analysis, What Is Now Possible
(
Citations: 65
)
Mehdilaurent Akkar
,
Régis Bevan
,
Paul Dischamp
,
Didier Moyart
Conference:
International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security  ASIACRYPT
, pp. 489502, 2000
LeakageResilient PublicKey Cryptography in the BoundedRetrieval Model
(
Citations: 31
)
Joël Alwen
,
Yevgeniy Dodis
,
Daniel Wichs
Conference:
International Crytology Conference  CRYPTO
, pp. 3654, 2009
Memory LeakageResilient Encryption Based on Physically Unclonable Functions
(
Citations: 7
)
Frederik Armknecht
,
Roel Maes
,
Ahmadreza Sadeghi
,
Berk Sunar
,
Pim Tuyls
Conference:
International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security  ASIACRYPT
, pp. 685702, 2009
On cryptography with auxiliary input
(
Citations: 37
)
Yevgeniy Dodis
,
Yael Tauman Kalai
,
Shachar Lovett
Conference:
ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing  STOC
, pp. 621630, 2009
PublicKey Encryption Schemes with Auxiliary Inputs
(
Citations: 19
)
Yevgeniy Dodis
,
Shafi Goldwasser
,
Yael Tauman Kalai
,
Chris Peikert
,
Vinod Vaikuntanathan
Conference:
Theory of Cryptography
, pp. 361381, 2010
Sort by:
Citations
(3)
Introduction to differential power analysis
(
Citations: 7
)
Paul C. Kocher
,
Joshua Jaffe
,
Benjamin Jun
,
Pankaj Rohatgi
Published in 2011.
Parallel Repetition for Leakage Resilience Amplification Revisited
Abhishek Jain
,
Krzysztof Pietrzak
,
Y. Ishai
Conference:
Theory of Cryptography
, pp. 5869, 2011
LeakageResilient RFID Authentication with ForwardPrivacy
Shin’ichiro Matsuo
,
Le Trieu Phong
,
Miyako Ohkubo
,
Moti Yung
Published in 2010.