Topological Theories of Social Choice

Topological Theories of Social Choice,10.1016/S0169-7218(10)00018-3,Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,Baigent Nicholas

Topological Theories of Social Choice   (Citations: 7)
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This chapter presents a simple introduction to the main results in topological social choice theory. Given a continuous social welfare function, these results show the following: (i) Unanimity and Anonymity are incompatible; (ii) Weak Pareto and No Veto are incompatible; and (iii) Weak Pareto implies the existence of a Strategic Manipulator. Given the role of continuity in all these results, its justification is critically discussed. Finally, a remarkable proof of Arrow's theorem using topological methods is presented.
Journal: Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare , vol. 2, pp. 301-334, 2011
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