Are incentives against economic justice?

Are incentives against economic justice?,10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.005,Journal of Economic Theory,Rodrigo A. Velez

Are incentives against economic justice?  
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We consider the problem of fairly allocating a social endowment of indivisible goods and money when the domain of admissible preferences contains, but is not restricted to, quasi-linear preferences. We analyze the manipulability of the Generalized Money Rawlsian Fair (GMRF) solutions. (i) We show that the Nash and strong Nash equilibrium correspondences of the “preference revelation game form” associated with each GMRF solution coincide with the no-envy solution (in equilibrium, efficiency is preserved according to agents' true preferences). (ii) A corollary is that the GMRF solutions “naturally implement” the no-envy solution in Nash and strong Nash equilibria.
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - J ECON THEOR , vol. 146, no. 1, pp. 326-345, 2011
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