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Internal governance mechanisms and firm performance in China
Internal governance mechanisms and firm performance in China   (Citations: 7)
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Corporate governance issues arising from concentrated ownership structure in emerging economies have received growing attention. Adopting a principal–principal perspective, this paper employs structural equation modeling to evaluate the independent and interdependent effects of internal governance mechanisms in enhancing firms’ value in China. Based on a 3-year dataset covering 304 publicly listed companies over 2003–2005, our findings suggest that ownership concentration has the most significant governance effect and has impacted negatively on firm performance. Furthermore, the governance role of the board of directors and supervisory boards is found to have been hindered by ownership concentration, rendering them unable to improve firm performance at present.
Journal: Asia Pacific Journal of Management - ASIA PAC J MANAG , vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 727-749, 2010
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    • ...A second explanation is that supervisory directors often have a low status and therefore limited power in Asian companies (Hu, Tam, & Tan, 2010)...
    • ...Beyond the topics addressed by the papers in this Special Issue, additional papers in regular issues of APJM address other important issues in corporate governance, such as executive compensation (Sun, Zhao, & Yang, 2010), CEO dismissals (Li & Lu, 2011; Pi & Lowe, 2011), supervisory boards (Hu et al., 2010), private benefits of control (Luo, Wan, & Cai, 2011), business groups (Ramaswamy, Li, & Petitt, 2011), and ...

    Steven Globermanet al. Corporate governance and Asian companies

    • ...As China emerges as a global economic power, the strategy, governance, and performance of Chinese firms necessitate more research attention (Chen & Young, 2009; Hu, Tam, & Tan, 2009; Li & Peng, 2008; Quer, Claver, & Rienda, 2007; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005)...
    • ...The influence of organizational slack on firm performance is also determined by how the firm uses its slack (Hu et al., 2009)...
    • ...In China’s SOEs, agency problems are serious (Chen & Young, 2009; Hu et al., 2009)...

    Mike W. Penget al. CEO duality, organizational slack, and firm performance in China

    • ...Thus, the empirical results of studies focused on the US may not be applied to China because of the unique corporate governance characteristics of the Chinese listed companies, such as the highly concentrated ownership structure, severe interventions of the government, the weak legal protection for shareholders, and a negligible market control mechanism (Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2006; Hu, Tam, & Tan, 2010)...

    Lili Piet al. Can a powerful CEO avoid involuntary replacement?—An empirical study f...

    • ...Under what circumstances will firms with concentrated ownership experience less appropriation of minority shareholder value by controlling shareholders (in other words, experience a lower level of PBC)? Recently, scholars have emphasized two internal governance mechanisms: (1) the independent director system (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Hu, Tam, & Tan, 2010; Peng, 2004; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Ye, Lu, & Zhang, 2007) and (2) the ...
    • ...Therefore, board independence is supposed to provide defense against the tunneling behaviors by controlling shareholders and independent directors play a critical role (Hu et al., 2010 ;S hleifer &V ishny,1997)...
    • ...Hence, independent directors are expected to play a more active and effective monitoring role than executive (inside) directors (Hu et al., 2010; Johnson, Daily, &E llstrand,1996)...
    • ...In China, the one-dominant controlling shareholder phenomenon (yigududa )i s still typical in most listed companies (Hu et al., 2010)...
    • ...4 Controlling shareholder averagely owns nearly half of a listed company in Chinese listed companies (Chen et al., 2009; Hu et al., 2010)...
    • ...Following previous studies (Chen et al., 2010; Hu et al., 2010; Lo, Wong, &...
    • ...In view of the fact that the one-dominant controlling shareholder phenomenon (yigududa )i s still severe in most Chinese listed companies (Hu et al., 2010), Chinese policymakers and regulators should make an extra effort to reduce the level of ownership concentration and investors should avoid investing in listed companies with highly concentrated ownership structures...
    • ...In comparing our findings with previous studies (Chen et al., 2010; Hu et al., 2010; Peng, 2004; Su et al., 2008), our empirical findings provide strong evidence that board independence impacts negatively on controlling shareholders’ extracting PBC in Chinese listed companies...

    Jin-hui Luoet al. The private benefits of control in Chinese listed firms: Do cash flow ...

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