Comparing the effectiveness of employment subsidies

Comparing the effectiveness of employment subsidies,10.1016/j.labeco.2010.11.001,Labour Economics,Alessio J. G. Brown,Christian Merkl,Dennis J. Snower

Comparing the effectiveness of employment subsidies   (Citations: 13)
BibTex | RIS | RefWorks Download
This paper examines the implications of different types of employment subsidies for employment, welfare, and inequality. It investigates how these effects depend on what target groups the subsidies address. Our analysis focuses on policies that are “approximately welfare efficient” (AWE), i.e. policies that (a) improve employment and welfare, (b) do not raise earnings inequality and (c) are self-financing. We construct a microfounded, dynamic model of hiring and separations and calibrate it with German data. The calibration shows that hiring vouchers can be AWE, while low-wage subsidies are not AWE. Furthermore, hiring vouchers targeted at the long-term unemployed are more effective than those targeted at low-ability workers.
Journal: Labour Economics - LABOUR ECON , vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 168-179, 2011
Cumulative Annual
View Publication
The following links allow you to view full publications. These links are maintained by other sources not affiliated with Microsoft Academic Search.
Sort by: