<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><rss version="2.0"><channel><title>RSS for FITS</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Rss.aspx?id=3844&amp;cata=5</link><description>Search RSS feed for Microsoft Academic Search</description><generator>MSRA Libra RSS Burner</generator><copyright>(c)2008 Microsoft Corpration, All right reserved.</copyright><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:52:18 GMT</pubDate><lastBuildDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:52:18 GMT</lastBuildDate><category /><item><title>The design of an adaptive intrusion tolerant database system</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/3877521</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:52:18 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">3877521</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/3165345">Pramote Luenam</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/733419">Peng Liu</a><span style="margin-left:20px">(Citations:21)</span><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ist.psu.edu/s2/paper/AITDB-dsn02.pdf">view publication</a></span></p><p>This paper presents the design of an adaptive intrusion tolerant database system, called AITDB. The goal of AITDB is to provide database applications with a stabilized level of data integrity and availability in face of attacks. Using a rule-based adaptation mechanism and a set of reconfigurati on operators, AITDB automatically adapts itself to the dynamic changes of environment according ...</p><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item><item><title>Self-securing storage: protecting data in compromised systems</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/3725847</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:52:17 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">3725847</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/205155">John D. Strunk</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/737180">Garth R. Goodson</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/8962710">Michael L. Scheinholtz</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/1367475">C. A. N. Soules</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/875810">G. R. Ganger</a><span style="margin-left:20px">(Citations:16)</span><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=01264933">view publication</a></span></p><p>Self-securing storage prevents intruders from undetectably tampering with or permanently deleting stored data. To accomplish this, self-securing storage devices internally audit all requests and keep old versions of data for a window of time, regardless of the commands received from potentially compromised host operating systems. Within the window, system administrators have this valuable information for intrusion diagnosis and ...</p><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item><item><title>SITAR: a scalable intrusion-tolerant architecture for distributed services</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/2048220</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:52:16 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">2048220</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/44479675">Feiyi Wang</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/5776444">Frank Jou</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/53413296">Fengmin Gong</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/1189255">Chandramouli Sargor</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/542686">Katerina Goseva-Popstojanova</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/32876">Kishor Trivedi</a><span style="margin-left:20px">(Citations:12)</span><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=01264942">view publication</a></span></p><p>This paper presents a intrusion tolerant architecture for distributed services, especially COTS servers. An intrusion tolerant system assumes that attacks will happen, and some will be successful. However, a wide range of mission critical applications need to provide continuous service despite active attacks or partial compromise. The proposed architecture emphasizes on continuity of operation. It strives to mitigate the effects ...</p><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item><item><title>Linux security modules: general security support for the linux kernel</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/50333503</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:52:15 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">50333503</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/10218850">Chris Wright</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/2278252">Crispin Cowan</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/648444">James Morris</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/709218">S. Smalley</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/1370348">G. Kroah-Hartman</a><span style="margin-left:20px">(Citations:6)</span><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=1264934">view publication</a></span></p><p>The access control mechanisms of existing mainstream operating systems are inadequate to provide strong system security. Enhanced access control mechanisms have failed to win acceptance into mainstream operating systems due in part to a lack of consensus within the security community on the right solution. Since general-purpose operating systems must satisfy a wide range of user requirements, any access ...</p><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item><item><title>Buffer overflows: attacks and defenses for the vulnerability of the decade</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/50333504</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:52:14 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">50333504</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/2278252">Crispin Cowan</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/713260">Perry Wagle</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/2137852">Calton Pu</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/801452">Steve Beattie</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/2330106">Jonathan Walpole</a><span style="margin-left:20px">(Citations:7)</span><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=01264935">view publication</a></span></p><p>Buffer overflows have been the most common form of security vulnerability for the last ten years. More over, buffer overflow vulnerabilities dominate the area of remote network penetration vulnerabilities, where an anonymous Internet user seeks to gain partial or total control of a host. If buffer overflow vulnerabilities could be effectively eliminated, a very large portion of the most serious ...</p><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item><item><title>Detecting and countering system intrusions using software wrappers</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/50333514</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:52:13 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">50333514</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/1143555">Calvin Ko</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/215132">Timothy Fraser</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/45404">Lee Badger</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/47460466">Douglas Kilpatrick</a><span style="margin-left:20px">(Citations:2)</span><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=1264947">view publication</a></span></p><p>This paper introduces an approach that integrates intrusion detection (ID) techniques with software wrapping technology to enhance a system’s ability to defend against intrusions. In particular, we employ the NAI Labs Generic Software Wrapper Toolkit to implement all or part of an intrusion detection system as ID wrappers. An ID wrapper is a software layer dynamically inserted into the kernel ...</p><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item><item><title>The design and implementation of an intrusion tolerant system</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/50333510</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:52:12 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">50333510</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/53014949">James Reynolds</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/3339159">James Just</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/55478395">Ed Lawson</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/3339160">Larry Clough</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/3339161">R. Maglich</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/743612">Karl Levitt</a><span style="margin-left:20px">(Citations:5)</span><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=1264943">view publication</a></span></p><p>We describe the implementation of an intrusion tolerant system for providing Internet services to known users through secure connections. Network attacks are treated as maliciously devised conditions to exploit design, implementation, or configuration faults, intrusions (successful attacks) are treated as failures, and their effects are mitigated by using the three pillars of fault tolerance: detection, isolation, and recovery. Fundamental to ...</p><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item><item><title>Hardening COTS software with generic software wrappers</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/50333513</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:52:11 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">50333513</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/215132">T. Fraser</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/45404">L. Badger</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/635942">M. Feldman</a><span style="margin-left:20px">(Citations:5)</span><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=01264946">view publication</a></span></p><p>Numerous techniques exist to augment the security functionality of Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) applications and operating systems, making them more suitable for use in mission-critical systems. Although individually useful, as a group these techniques present difficulties to system developers because they are not based on a common framework which might simplify integration and promote portability and reuse. This ...</p><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item><item><title>Design and evaluation of a wide-area event notification service</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/50333509</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:52:10 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">50333509</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/832349">ANTONIO CARZANIGA</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/59042">DAVID S. ROSENBLUM</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/1688876">ALEXANDER L. WOLF</a><span style="margin-left:20px">(Citations:3)</span><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=01264940">view publication</a></span></p><p>The components of a loosely coupled system are typically designed to operate by generating and responding to asynchronous events. An event notification service is an application-independent infrastructure that supports the construction of event-based systems, whereby generators of events publish event notifications to the infrastructure and consumers of events subscribe with the infrastructure to receive relevant notifications. The two ...</p><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item><item><title>Protection of software-based survivability mechanisms</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/50333508</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:52:09 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">50333508</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/47755419">Chenxi Wang</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/147433">Jack Davidson</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/832662">Jonathan Hill</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/97170">John Knight</a><span style="margin-left:20px">(Citations:2)</span><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=1264939">view publication</a></span></p><p>Many existing survivability mechanisms rely on software-based system monitoring and control. Some of the software resides on application hosts that are not necessarily trustworthy. The integrity of these software components is therefore essential to the reliability and trustworthiness of the survivability scheme. In this paper we address the problem of protecting trusted software on untrustworthy hosts by software transformations. ...</p><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item><item><title>Survival by defense-enabling</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/50333507</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:52:08 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">50333507</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/405040">Partha Pal</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/705204">Franklin Webber</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/682253">Richard Schantz</a><span style="margin-left:20px">(Citations:1)</span><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=01264938">view publication</a></span></p><p>Attack survival, which means the ability to provide some level of service despite an ongoing attack by tolerating its impact, is an important objective of security research. In this paper we present a new approach to survivability and intrusion tolerance. Our approach, which we call “survival by defense” is based on the observation that many applications can be given increased ...</p><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item><item><title>Architectures for intrusion tolerant database systems</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/50333495</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:52:07 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">50333495</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/733419">Peng Liu</a><span style="margin-left:20px">(Citations:1)</span><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=1264924">view publication</a></span></p><p>In this paper, we propose four architectures for intrusion-tolerant database systems. While traditional secure database systems rely on prevention controls, an intrusion-tolerant database system can operate through attacks in such a way that the system can continue delivering essential services in the face of attacks. With a focus on attacks by malicious transactions, Architecture I can detect intrusions, ...</p><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item><item><title>Protecting privacy using the decentralized label model</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/50333499</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:52:06 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">50333499</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/117533">Andrew C. Myers</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/1717780">Barbara Liskov</a><span style="margin-left:20px">(Citations:1)</span><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=1264929">view publication</a></span></p><p>Stronger protection is needed for the confidentiality and integrity of data, because programs containing untrusted code are the rule rather than the exception. Information flow control allows the enforcement of end-to-end security policies but has been difficult to put into practice. This paper describes the decentralized label model, a new label model for control of information flow in ...</p><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item><item><title>Foundational proof-carrying code</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/50333496</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:52:05 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">50333496</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/584767">Andrew W. Appel</a><span style="margin-left:20px">(Citations:1)</span><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=01264926">view publication</a></span></p><p>Proof-carrying code is a framework for the mechanical verification of safety properties of machine language programs, but the problem arises of quis custodiat ipsos custodes—who will verify the verifier itself? Foundational proof-carrying code is verification from the smallest possible set of axioms, using the simplest possible verifier and the smallest possible runtime system. I will describe many ...</p><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item><item><title>Learning unknown attacks - a start</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/50333511</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:52:04 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">50333511</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/3339159">James E. Just</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/53014949">James C. Reynolds</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/3339160">Larry A. Clough</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/3372929">Melissa Danforth</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/743612">Karl N. Levitt</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/3339161">Ryan Maglich</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/10502522">Jeff Rowe</a><span style="margin-left:20px">(Citations:1)</span><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=01264944">view publication</a></span></p><p>Since it is essentially impossible to write large-scale software without errors, any intrusion tolerant system must be able to tolerate rapid, repeated unknown attacks without exhausting its redundancy. Our system provides continued application services to critical users while under attack with a goal of less than 25% degradation of productivity. Initial experimental results are promising. It is not yet ...</p><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item><item><title>Making mobile code both safe and efficient</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/2292045</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:52:03 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">2292045</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/541196">Michael Franz</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/132760">Wolfram Amme</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/1088634">Matthew Beers</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/110372">Niall Dalton</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/5768">Peter H. Frohlich</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/206000">Vivek Haldar</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/2699477">Andreas Hartmann</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/2039446">Peter S. Housel</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/413565">F. Reig</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/652437">Jeffery von Ronne</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/27794">Christian H. Stork</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/6822800">Sergiy Zhenochin</a><span style="margin-left:20px">(Citations:2)</span><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=1264941">view publication</a></span></p><p>Mobile programs can potentially be malicious. To pro- tect itself, a host that receives such mobile programs from an untrusted party or via an untrusted network connection will want some kind of guarantee that the mobile code is not about to cause any damage. The traditional solution to this problem has been verification, by which the receiving host examines the ...</p><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item><item><title>Quantifying the cost of providing intrusion tolerance in group communication systems</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/50333505</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:52:02 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">50333505</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/1470677">HariGovind V. Ramasamy</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/50339070">Prashant Pandey</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/81328">James Lyons</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/41688">Michel Cukier</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/34118">William H. Sanders</a><span style="margin-left:20px">(Citations:2)</span><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=01264936">view publication</a></span></p><p>Group communication systems that provide consistent group membership and reliable, ordered multicast properties in the presence of faults resulting from malicious intrusions have not been analyzed extensively to quantify the cost of tolerating these intrusions. This paper attempts to quantify this cost by presenting results from an experimental evaluation of three new intrusion-tolerant microprotocols that have been added to ...</p><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item><item><title>Formal specification and verification of a group membership protocol for an intrusion-tolerant group communication system</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/50333506</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:52:01 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">50333506</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/1470677">HariGovind V. Ramasamy</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/41688">Michel Cukier</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/34118">William H. Sanders</a><span style="margin-left:20px">(Citations:2)</span><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=1264937">view publication</a></span></p><p>We describe a group membership protocol that is part of an intrusion-tolerant group communication system, and present an effort to use formal tools to model and validate our protocol. We describe in detail the most difficult part of the validation exercise, which was the determination of the right level of abstraction of the protocol for formally specifying the protocol. ...</p><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item><item><title>COCA: a secure distributed online certification authority</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/50333502</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:52:00 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">50333502</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/10219080">Lidong Zhou</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/1392353">FRED B. SCHNEIDER</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/1085741">ROBBERT VAN RENESSE</a><span style="margin-left:20px">(Citations:1)</span><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=01264932">view publication</a></span></p><p>COCA is a fault-tolerant and secure online certification authority that has been built and deployed both in a local area network and in the Internet. Extremely weak assumptions characterize environments in which COCA’s protocols execute correctly: no assumption is made about execution speed and message delivery delays; channels are expected to exhibit only intermittent reliability; and with 3t + ...</p><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item><item><title>Developing a heterogeneous intrusion tolerant CORBA system</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/50333512</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:51:59 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">50333512</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/47766935">David Sames</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/1839036">Brian Matt</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/2248751">Brian Niebuhr</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/335058">G. Tally</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/2209623">B. Whitmore</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/631542">D. Bakken</a><span style="margin-left:20px" /><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=1264945">view publication</a></span></p><p>Intrusion Tolerant systems provide high-integrity and high-availability services to their clients in the face of successful attacks from an adversary. The Intrusion Tolerant Distributed Object Systems (ITDOS) research project 1 is developing an architecture for a heterogeneous intrusion tolerant distributed object system. ITDOS integrates a Byzantine Fault Tolerant multicast protocol into an open-source CORBA ORB to provide ...</p><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item><item><title>Untrusted hosts and confidentiality: secure program partitioning</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/50333501</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:51:58 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">50333501</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/479215">Steve Zdancewic</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/643901">Lantian Zheng</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/31741">Nathaniel Nystrom</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/117533">Andrew C. Myers</a><span style="margin-left:20px" /><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=1264931">view publication</a></span></p><p>This paper presents secure program partitioning, a language-based technique for protecting confidential data during computation in distributed systems containing mutually untrusted hosts. Confidentiality and integrity policies can be expressed by annotating programs with security types that constrain information flow; these programs can then be partitioned automatically to run securely on heterogeneously trusted hosts. The resulting communicating subprograms collectively implement ...</p><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item><item><title>A type system for certi .ed binaries</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/50333498</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:51:57 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">50333498</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/1779754">Zhong Shao</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/12597110">V. Trifonov</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/524161">B. Saha</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/561314">N. Papaspyrou</a><span style="margin-left:20px" /><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=1264928">view publication</a></span></p><p /><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item><item><title>Enforceable security policies</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/50333500</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:51:56 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">50333500</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/1392353">FRED B. SCHNEIDER</a><span style="margin-left:20px" /><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=01264930">view publication</a></span></p><p>A precise characterization is given for the class of security policies enforceable with mechanisms that work by monitoring system execution, and automata are introduced for specifying exactly that class of security policies. Techniques to enforce security policies specified by such automata are also discussed.</p><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item><item><title>Type-preserving compilation of featherweight java</title><link>http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/50333497</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 04:51:55 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">50333497</guid><description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/1779754">Zhong Shao</a>, <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Author/47413500">Valery Trifonov</a><span style="margin-left:20px" /><span style="margin-left:20px"><a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=1264927">view publication</a></span></p><p>We present an efficient encoding of core Java constructs in a simple, implementable typed intermediate language. The encoding, after type erasure, has the same operational behavior as a standard implementation using vtables and self-application for method invocation. Classes inherit super-class methods with no overhead. We support mutually recursive classes while preserving separate compilation. Our strategy extends naturally to ...</p><cite>Conference: <a href="http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Conference/3844">Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems - FITS</a>, 2003</cite><cite></cite>]]></description></item></channel></rss>